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Introduction
The energy sector is getting a lot of attention across the world nowadays. A new spiral of the reform discussion in the energy sector has been recently established by the Mexican government. The reason for that is a deficit of proved reserves of the crude oil. On the other hand, around 70% of the produced electricity has the fossil source. The growing demand for electricity and the resources deficit drive governmental authorities to discuss different possibilities to solve the problem. One of the possibilities is the massive attraction of the private/foreign capital, which necessary means at least partial deregulation/privatization of the sectors. For such an option, an oligopolistic market structures will become natural, not only due to the mutual influence on the prices due to the exercising the market power, but also by the naturally limited number of introduced firm-producers at the market. The computational game theoretic modeling tool offered in this paper is composed as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP) solved by the software GAMS.
We present the results of the experiments done for the Cournot-Nash equilibrium and the Stackelberg equilibrium with a state-owned or a private company as the leader, respectively. This paper is structured as follows: in Section 2, we present the mathematical model we use and show the data used by the model. Numerical results are given in Section 3, whereas the analysis and the future development forecast finish the paper.
Consider two firms producing electricity. Let G represent the total output, and ( ) The profit of firm 1 is given by: 
Problem (4) - (6) is a standard complementarity problem. Therefore, applying analogous methods as in [8] , we obtain the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Stackelberg Model with Leadership of Domestic (Public) Firm
First, in this subsection, we examine the game where firm 2 (the public one) is the leader. 
Let ( )
0 be the (optimal) reaction function of firm 1; that is, the value that satisfies the equality: is the optimal response of the private firm. The following three relationships: 
define a complementarity problem, analogous to that discussed in [8] . is the optimal response of the domestic company. The following three relationships: 
Stackelberg Model with Leadership of Foreign (Private) Firm
define a complementarity problem, analogous to that discussed in [8] . The total value of the electricity produced in the perfect competition scenario is equal to
Perfect Competition
G. = + 1 2
Numerical Results.
In order to organize our numerical experiments, we shall take the electricity data available for Mexico for the year 2004. At the moment we only have one transmission operator and seller -it is the national monopolist CFE, but recently, the Mexican Parliament started discussions about possibility of the energy reform in Mexico, which will allow for more private capital participation. Due to this fact, we allocate the capacities in the Northern part of Mexico as a private company, as the Northern part is considered to be the most industrially developed part, attracting the lion's part of the foreign investments. In fact, this assumption is not that much unrealistic: about 25% of total installed capacity in Mexico is considered to be private, although private producers do not have possibility to sell their good directly to customers. The table 1 presents the production capacities of the foreign and public firms by different production technologies. Note: CHP denotes the combined heat and power production factories.
The dependence of the electricity price upon its supply is given as the following inverse demand function At the moment, we do not assume any transmission restrictions or transmission prices involved in the model, as well as we do not calculate transmission losses and transmission prices; and we do not distinguish customers (e.g. housing, industry, agriculture). These simplifying assumptions do not restrict our study of the reaction of the wholesale prices under different market strategies.
The following Note: the prices are given in Mexican pesos ($).
This program codes are composed in GAMS as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP) solved by a nonlinear complementarity and equation system solvers.
Conclusions
Nowadays, the Mexican electricity market can be represented as a monopolistic market structure. If we consider a possible energy reform allowing certain competition between the state-owned monopolist CFE and private investors, we receive the whole palette of different market behaviors, which were offered and analyzed in [8] .
In this paper, we realize numerical experiments for the Mexico energy market, taking into account different production technologies, available in Mexico.
From table 2 we see that the leadership of the stateowned firm, which is the most probable scenario in case of the energy reform, is preferable for the customer.
Altogether, the Stackelberg model with a state or private leader shows somewhat better results from the customer point of view.
The Perfect Competition is, of course, the best option by far, but also little realistic and even dangerous in term of the security of supply: strongly increasing demand may exhaust the up-to-now installed capacities production, and revenues and/or natural resources shortage may not allow to expand the production considerably.
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